

Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics

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We underestimate the properly political power to change social life by changing the representation of social life, and by putting a modicum of imagination in power.

Pierre Bourdieu, “Donner la parole aux gens sans parole” (1977)

Pierre Bourdieu has rarely been read as a political sociologist or philosopher.¹ And yet there is sense in which his *oeuvre* as well as much of his intellectual activity represents a sustained, multiprong attempt to chisel a science of the social conditions of possibility of democracy – broadly defined as that social state wherein everyone would possess both the inclination and the ability to take matters political into their own hands – and to detect the historical pitfalls and possibilities of the struggles aimed at fostering its advance in different realms of life. The epicentral place that the notion of symbolic power and issues of representation, delegation, nomination, and (mis)recognition occupy in Bourdieu’s work suggest that they constitute a major untapped store of concepts, theories, and insights for rethinking the links between freedom, justice, and politics.

It is useful, to elucidate the vexed relation of Bourdieu to the question of democratic politics, to distinguish, if only for the sake of analytical clarity, between three tightly intervoven elements: (1) the *personal* political views of the individual Pierre Bourdieu, which are pertinent insofar as they animate his scientific practice and civic engagements; (2) politics as encountered *in* his sociological writings, or how he treats the official institutions that compose the public sphere of liberal democracies, parties and unions, parliaments and polls, the media and the state, as objects of social scientific inquiry; and, last but not least, (3) the politics *of* Bourdieu’s works, that is, the role he assigns to science and intellectuals in democratic battles, and the implications and uses of his thought in and for the gamut of power struggles ranging from intimate gender battles on the home front to the cross-continental mass mobilization against the neoliberal revolution sweeping the globe today. A brief consideration of each of these elements helps set the stage for the following special section, which brings together articles that variously explicate theoretically and extend empirically Bourdieu’s conception of democracy, and demonstrate the heuristic potency of his theory of symbolic power as applied to organized politics.

The Personal Politics of Pierre Bourdieu

From early on in his youth, Bourdieu was consistently a man of the left – of the “*gauche de gauche*,” as he famously put it in a biting criticism of the rightward turn and renunciations of the Socialist Party in the mid-nineties that has since become a standard phrase of French political language.² He owed this proclivity to his upbringing in a remote rural region of southwestern France where support for socialist ideals ran strong amidst the ambient conservatism, as did sympathy for the “*frente popular*” during the Spanish Civil War and the Communist-led Resistance to German occupation during World War II.³ His father was the son of an itinerant sharecropper who, although he left school at fourteen, rose at mid-life to become the postman of the tiny mountain village where Bourdieu spent his childhood. He was a union supporter and voted far on the left. He instilled in little Pierre an abiding respect for “regular folks” – which in this isolated locale meant small peasants, farm laborers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers – and an acute sensitivity to social (in)justice as well as admiration for the great figures of the French republican left, Robespierre, Jean Jaurès, and Léon Blum, that had inspired the civic vision of the Durkheimians a half-century earlier.⁴ The father had an anarchist and rebellious streak, which he also bequeathed to his only son.

This initial left propensity, buttressed by a strong regional culture that valorizes restiveness towards authority, was powerfully reinforced by Bourdieu’s experience as an ethnic and class outsider in the affluent milieu of the elite high school in Paris where he completed his secondary education on a government scholarship and later at the *Ecole normale supérieure* at the Rue d’Ulm, where he received his training in philosophy among the cream of France’s young minds in the early fifties. There he gravitated towards schoolmates and teachers (such as Georges Canguilhem) who, like him, were of lower social extraction and provincial provenance, which correlates strongly with left political leanings. But, unlike most students of his generation, Bourdieu did not join the Communist Party then hegemonic on the intellectual scene.⁵ Indeed, he was repelled by Stalinist sectarianism and never in his life took up membership in an established political organization, party, union, or civic association. He had acquired during his stint as a boarder in the public *lycée* of Pau a keen sense of the structural duplicity, even hypocrisy, that warps official institutions. This initial *anti-institutional disposition* was confirmed by witnessing first-hand – and studying sociologically – the horrors of French colonial policy during the Algerian war of independence,⁶ and it only grew stronger over the ensuing decades.

Thus, Bourdieu always engaged with politics, but from a principled “sniper’s position,” so to speak, anchored by a commitment to maintaining his independence from organized outfits, which he viewed as a *sine qua non* of scientific work. In May 1981, when the Socialist Party rose to power for the first time under France’s Fifth Republic, he was already staunchly in the left opposition to Mitterrand – his forewarnings about the latter’s corrupt ways and the rightward

tilt of the Socialist Party were later to prove premonitory. Through the eighties, he repeatedly defended the “libertarian tradition of the Left” against the “governmental Left” willing to curtail debate, smother critique, and reduce policy options in deference to the organizational necessities of party discipline and state management.⁷ In the nineties, he sought to put the competencies of social science at the service of a decentralized network of democratic struggles spearheaded by a new wave of progressive associations and “coordinations” bypassing traditional agencies of social protest, such as the converging mobilizations of the “*sans*” (those “without”: the *jobless*, *homeless*, and *paperless* migrants) and the emerging transnational currents fighting the spread of neoliberal globalization. Some were surprised by the vigor of his public involvement in worldly politics in the wake of the publication of *La Misère du monde*⁸ and the wide-ranging social and political reactions it triggered – after the founding of the militant academic group *Raisons d’agir* in 1996 and the launching of a publishing house that year, rumor in Paris even had it that Bourdieu was about to run for office. But, in reality, from his youthful days as an apprentice anthropologist vivisectioning the Algerian war to his path-breaking sociology on the contribution of culture to the perpetuation of class inequality at the start of the era of university expansion to his later public condemnations of the social wreckage left by policies of market deregulation and social retrenchment, Bourdieu continually fused scientific inquiry and political activism.⁹ Doing social science was always for him an indirect way of doing politics: what changed over time is the dosage of those two elements and the degree of *scientific sublimation* of his political pulsions.

Democratic Politics in Bourdieu’s Work

Aside from his analysis of the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria and conflicts over education in the era of mass schooling, Pierre Bourdieu’s first writings trained squarely on democratic politics date from the launching of the journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* in 1975. They comprise a first cluster centered on the *ruling-class ideology*, the *culture-politics link*, and the *workings of the political field*.¹⁰

In a book-length article on “The Production of Dominant Ideology” published two years after Giscard d’Estaing’s entrance in the Elysée Palace, Bourdieu mapped out the “common places” and “neutral sites” constitutive of the new social philosophy of a “reconverted conservatism” painted in the soothing colors of human progress, technoscientific reason, and measured change stamped by optimistic evolutionism. He showed this new vision of and for power to be “a discourse without a subject whose primary function is to express and produce the logical and moral integration of the dominant class.”¹¹ In “Questions of Politics,” Bourdieu turned his sights toward the other end of the social spectrum to demonstrate that the “no responses” of opinion polls and abstentions in elections have a deeply political meaning: they reveal that the ability to proffer a properly political

expression in the public sphere, far from being universally given to all, is contingent upon possessing “the socially recognized competency and the sentiment of being founded to do so.”¹² This argument was reworked in the chapter on “Culture and Politics” in *Distinction*, where Bourdieu revealed a homology between the space of social positions and the space of position-takings in the political arena, albeit at the cost of a “systematic deformation,” and spotlighted the opposition between two modalities of political expression: whereas among the working class political judgments stem from the ethical springs of the class ethos in continuity with everyday reasoning, among the bourgeoisie they result from use of a properly political cypher applied to the specialized stances of political debate.¹³

The “radical discontinuity” between “ethos and logos, the practical mastery and verbal mastery” of the political game, made urgent the analysis of the functioning of the microcosm of representative politics.¹⁴ In “Political Representation: Towards a Theory of the Political Field,” Bourdieu supplied both an anatomy of the semi-autonomous world within which specialized agents and institutions vie to offer “politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression to ordinary citizens reduced to the status of consumers,” and one of the first exemplifications of his distinctive concept of “*champ*.”¹⁵ Analysis of the functioning of parties and parliaments suggests that the fundamental antinomy of democratic politics is that the act of *delegation*, whereby professional politicians are entrusted with the expression of the will of their constituents but pursue strategies aimed chiefly at one another, is always pregnant with the possibility of *dispossession* and even usurpation, and all the more so as the group represented is more deprived of economic and cultural capital.¹⁶ It also discloses that

[t]he political field is one of the privileged sites for the exercise of the *power of representation or manifestation* [in the sense of public demonstration – tr.] that contributes to making what existed in a practical state, tacitly or implicitly, exist fully, that is, in the objectified state, in a form directly visible to all, public, published, official, and thus authorized.¹⁷

The role of the political field as theater for the performative representation of the social world leads to the second major node of Bourdieu’s political sociology, namely, the issues of *authoritative nomination and the symbolic fabrication of collectives*, be they families, classes, ethnic groups, regions, nations, or genders.¹⁸ Against the latent economism that leads us “to underestimate the efficacy of this dimension of every power that is symbolic power,” Bourdieu asserts that “social science must encompass within the theory of the social world a theory of the theory effect,”¹⁹ that is, take full account of the fact that social reality is in good measure the product of a collective work of cognitive construction that operates in the ordinary encounters of everyday life as well as in the fields of cultural production and in “the clashes of visions and predictions of the properly political struggle” through which a definite conception of the pertinent “divisions of the

social world” obtains.²⁰ But, against approaches that absolutize language and seek in the immanent features of communication the springs of its power to shape reality, Bourdieu argues that “the mystery of performative magic resolves itself in the mystery of the ministry,” that is, in the “alchemy of *representation* (in the different senses of the term) whereby the representative makes the group that makes him.”²¹ The efficacy of performative discourse is directly proportional to the authority of the agent that enunciates it and to its degree of congruence with the objective partitions of society: this Bourdieu demonstrates in *Language and Symbolic Power* through a series of case studies in “sociological pragmatics,” on religious ceremony, scholarly myth, philosophical argumentation, and the “rites of institution” whereby salient social distinctions are absolutized by “solemn acts of categorization,” overlaying them with the collective assent of the group.²²

It is under this heading that one may put Bourdieu’s influential analysis of the political uses and social effects of public opinion polls as a modality of “expression” of the will of “the people,” supplementing, complicating, and even rivaling the two other major means of popular voice in liberal democracy, elections and street demonstrations. In “Public Opinion Does Not Exist,” Bourdieu questions the three tacit tenets at the basis of polls that everyone can and does have an opinion, that all opinions are equal, and that there exists a prior consensus on the questions worthy of being posed to argue that “public opinion” as presented in the form of spot survey statistics in newspapers “is a pure and simple *artefact* whose function is to dissimulate the fact that the state of the opinion at a given moment is a system of forces, of tensions.”²³ Polls are an instrument not of political knowledge but of political action whose widespread use tends to devalue other means of group-making, such as strikes, demonstrations, or the very elections whose formally equalitarian aggregative logic they ostensibly mimic.²⁴

A third major contribution of Bourdieu to the sociology and philosophy of democratic politics clusters around his theory of the *field of power and of the state* as the agency that “successfully claims monopoly over the legitimate use” not only of “material violence” – as Max Weber famously proposed – but also of symbolic violence. The notion of field of power was elaborated by Bourdieu in the course of historical inquiries into the genesis and functioning of the artistic field in nineteenth-century France and through a series of monographic studies of top corporations, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, juridical authority, the higher civil service, and elite schools that posed concretely the problem of the conflict between different forms of power.²⁵ To escape the substantialism and misplaced realism inherent in the concept of “ruling class,” Bourdieu sketches the constellation of interlinked institutions within which the holders of various species of capital (economic, religious, legal, scientific, academic, artistic, etc.) vie to impose the supremacy of the particular kind of power they wield.

This struggle for the imposition of the *dominant principle of domination*, which leads at every moment to a state of equilibrium in the sharing of powers, that is to

say, to a *division of the labor of domination* (sometimes willed and conceived as such, and explicitly negotiated), is also a struggle over *the legitimate principle of legitimation* and, inseparably, over the legitimate mode of reproduction of the foundations of domination. It can take the form of actual confrontations (as with the “palace wars” or armed struggles between temporal and spiritual power-holders) or symbolic confrontations (such as those in the Middle Ages whose stake was the precedence of *oratores* over *bellatores*, or the struggles that played out throughout the nineteenth century, and continuing today, over the preeminence of merit over heredity or talent).²⁶

Anchored in the polar opposition between economic and cultural capital personified by the antagonism between the capitalist and the artist, the field of power coalesced as a result of structural differentiation fostering the emergence of a plurality of relatively autonomous fields, each governed by its own laws. This differentiation opened up the space within which jurists attached to the dynastic state gradually carved room for themselves and created the “bureaucratic field,” i.e., the set of impersonal public institutions officially devoted to serving the citizenry and laying claim to authoritative nomination and classification²⁷ – as with the granting of credentials (for positive sociodicy) and the bestowing of penal marks (for negative sociodicy).

This reconceptualization of the state as the central “bank of symbolic capital guaranteeing all acts of authority” situated at the barycenter of the field of power allows Bourdieu to break with the unitary vision of “the state” as an organizational monolith and to link the internal divisions and struggles it harbors – exemplified by the running conflict between its “right hand,” entrusted with the maintenance of the economic and legal order, and its “left hand,” charged with the sustenance of the dispossessed and the provision of public goods²⁸ – to the forces traversing social space. It also enables him to show that what tend to be taken to be political clashes between the dominant and subordinate classes are often collisions among different categories of the dominant (e.g., state managers versus corporate owners) and between the different mode of reproduction of capital that each favors (school-mediated acquisition versus hereditary transmission).²⁹ And that the state does not exist only “out there,” in the guise of bureaucracies, authorities, and ceremonies: it also lives “in here,” ineffaceably engraved in all of us in the form of the state-sanctioned mental categories acquired via schooling through which we cognitively construct the social world, so that we already consent to its dictates prior to committing any “political” act.³⁰ Finally, Bourdieu argues that the “lengthening of the chain of legitimation” attendant upon the establishment of the bureaucratic state and the contention between differentiated forms of capital introduces the possibility of “diverting” strategies of universalization to put them at the service of progressive goals: as the division of labor of domination grows more complex, as more competing agents (jurists, priests, scientists, civil servant, politicians, etc.) invoke civic disinterestedness to advance their specific interests, they create opportunities for the universal to advance.³¹

Bourdieu's tools for the analysis of democratic politics have been borrowed, deployed, and amended in wide-ranging historical, anthropological, sociological, and politological research.³² To stay in France, an important strand of political science led by Bernard Lacroix, Daniel Gaxie, and Michel Offerlé has dented the establishment with the help of his theories and produced a wealth of original studies of the core institutions of representative democracy, parties, voting, polls, and demonstrations.³³ But they have also been put into action, by Bourdieu himself and others, in the concrete struggles of the day.

Implications of Bourdieu's Theories for Democratic Struggles

Bourdieu was always acutely aware of the implications of his research for democratic politics and keen to disseminate its results to foster progressive transformation. Over the decades, he wrote, lectured, and consulted extensively on the practical teachings of his inquiries on colonial Algeria and rural change, education and pedagogy, access to the arts and television, housing policy and market deregulation, racism and discrimination, science and European integration, among other topics.³⁴ Indeed, along with the accumulation of scientific capital that gave weight to his interventions, one of the springs of his increased activism in the public sphere over time was a clearer realization of the applied ramifications of his analyses as the advances of his theories of habitus, field, and symbolic power gave him greater purchase on the workings of the institutions he sought to act upon or with.³⁵ Bourdieu also continually revised and refocused his analyses to capture extant political developments and the new threats directed at the democratic conquests of social movements. For instance, in the nineties the research line initiated two decades earlier by the study of ruling-class ideology was extended – as well as thoroughly revamped, in particular by jettisoning the notion of ideology altogether – by the study of the planetary diffusion of the “newspeak” of neoliberalism as the latest avatar of “the cunning of imperialist reason.”³⁶ The effort to elucidate the transnational economy of symbolic exchanges so as to foster a *Realpolitik* of reason at the European if not the global level³⁷ was complemented by the dissection of the “Stranglehold of the Journalistic Field,” disclosing how the mainstream media feed the generalized drift towards commodification by reinforcing the weight of those favoring the “commercial over the pure,” submission to market demand over the independent command of the craft, in all the realms they touch, whether it be literature, art, philosophy, science, television, or politics itself.³⁸

The first practical implication of Bourdieu's sociology of politics is to formulate anew the possible *role of intellectuals in contemporary struggles*. Based on a historical reconstruction of the institutionalization of the category from Voltaire to Zola to Sartre,³⁹ Bourdieu argues that, far from being antinomic (as academic “professionalism” would have it), intellectual autonomy and civic engagement can and must be joined in a synergistic relationship such that scientists, writers,

and artists increase the efficacy of their political interventions in and through the vigorous defense of their independence from economic and political powers.⁴⁰ But to counter the rising influence of “experts” and think-tanks who put technocratic science at the service of an increasingly rationalized mode of domination, cultural producers must move beyond the model of the “total intellectual” incarnated by Jean-Paul Sartre and of the “specific intellectual” favored by Foucault to create a “collective intellectual” through the pooling of the complementary competencies of scientific analysis and creative communication, capable of bringing the most rigorous products of research to bear on salient public debates in a continuous and organized manner – as *Raisons d’agir* sought to do on the European political scene.⁴¹ This collective intellectual has two urgent missions: the first is to “produce and disseminate instruments of defense against symbolic domination,” and in particular against the imposition of the prepackaged problematics of established politics; the second is to contribute to “the work of political invention” necessary to renew critical thought and to enable it to marry sociological realism with civic utopianism.⁴²

A second important teaching of Bourdieu’s inquiries for democratic practice is that political action must target not only institutions (i.e., historical systems of positions objectified in the public sphere) but also dispositions (schemata of perception, appreciation, and action deposited inside social agents). For genuine and lasting progressive change to occur, a politics of fields aimed at structured power relations must of necessity be *supplemented by a politics of habitus*, paying close attention to the social production and modalities of expression of political proclivities. This is because

[s]ymbolic action cannot, by itself, and outside of any transformation of the conditions of production and reinforcement of dispositions, extirpate embodied beliefs, passions, and pulsions that remain thoroughly indifferent to the injunctions or condemnations of humanistic universalism (itself also rooted in dispositions and beliefs).⁴³

Politics becomes a more complicated and more intimate affair once one realizes that adherence to the existing order operates primarily, not through the mediation of ideas and ideals, language games and ideological conviction, but through the “double naturalization” of the social world “resulting from its inscription in things and in bodies,” and through the silent and invisible agreement between social structures and mental structures.⁴⁴ This is particularly true of the “passions of the dominated habitus (from the standpoint of gender, culture, or language), somatized social relation, law of the social body converted into the law of the physical body,” which for that very reason “cannot be suspended by a mere awakening of consciousness.”⁴⁵ Yet our societies, marked by the proliferation of “situations of disadjustment” between habitus and world due to the generalization of access to education and the spread of social insecurity, offer a fertile terrain for

political interventions aimed at fracturing the doxic acceptance of the status quo and fostering the collective realization of alternative historical futures: “The belief that such and such future, desired or feared, is possible, probable or inevitable, can, in certain conjunctures, mobilize around itself a whole group and thus contribute to fostering or preventing the coming of that future.” Politics consists precisely in playing off and with this “looseness in the correspondence between subjective hopes and objective chances” so as “to introduce a margin of liberty between them.”⁴⁶

Taking after Blaise Pascal, Bourdieu’s philosophical anthropology conceives of humans as beings “devoid of *raison d’être*, inhabited by the need for justification” that only the judgment of others can grant.⁴⁷ This means that, far from being a novel development linked to the rise of “cultural diversity” in advanced societies, *the politics of recognition have always been with us*: they are intrinsic to the human condition. Issues of redistribution are inseparable from questions of *dignitas* insofar as social existence arises in and through distinction which necessarily assigns to each a differential social status and worth. And because the symbolic war of all against all never ends, there can be no political claim, no matter how coarsely material, that does not enclose a demand for social acknowledgment.⁴⁸ Here Bourdieu complicates current debates on deliberative democracy by suggesting that the quest for cultural recognition, recently proposed by prominent political philosophers as the aim of a progressive politics suited to the age of increased migration and incipient ethnic fragmentation, is an expression of the “scholastic bias” of academics who, projecting their hermeneutic relationship to the social world, forget that every relation of meaning is also a relation of force: culture is always an instrument of vision and di-vision, at once a product, a weapon, and a stake of struggles for symbolic life and death – and for this reason it cannot be the means to resolve the running battle for access to recognized social existence that everywhere defines and ranks humanity.⁴⁹ So much to remind us that the imperative of reflexivity, which is essential to Bourdieu’s conception of social science, applies equally to politics: intellectuals must continually turn their instruments of knowledge onto themselves in order to detect and control the manifold ways in which their posture as *lectores*, and the interests and strategies they pursue as independent cultural producers within the specific order of the intellectual field, shapes their construction of “the people” and their interpretation of the interests of citizens in liberal democracy.⁵⁰

A final political implication of Bourdieu’s agonistic conception of the social world, as suffused by relations of domination ultimately anchored in the necessarily unequal distribution of symbolic capital and the inescapable dialectic of distinction and pretention it activates, is that democracy is best conceived not as an affirmative state – of formal equality, equal capacity, or shared freedoms – but as a historical process of negation of social negation, a never-ending effort to make social relations *less* arbitrary, institutions *less* unjust, distributions of resources and options *less* imbalanced, recognition *less* scarce. And for this

Bourdieu supplies a general principle of political engagement: first to acknowledge that the conditions of access to political expression are not universally granted *a priori* to all but, on the contrary, that they are socially determined and differentially allocated; and then to work to universalize the ability and the propensity to act and think politically, that is, to universalize realistic means of gaining access to that particular historical embodiment of the universal that is democratic politics.

NOTES

1. With the exception of Germany and Latin America, where several collections of Bourdieu's dispersed essays on politics and intellectuals have fostered close readings of his views on power and democracy (see, for Germany, the volume of original pieces edited by Uwe H. Bittlingmayer, Jens Kastner, and Claudia Rademacher, *Theorie als Kampf? Zur politischen Soziologie Pierre Bourdieus* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2002), and Russia, where Natalia Schmatko edited a selection of Bourdieu's articles entitled *Sociology of Politics* in 1993). In the Anglo-American world, appropriations of Bourdieu's political sociology have tended to bunch up on the empirical side, but see George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), Orville Lee, "Culture and Democratic Theory: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Democracy," *Constellations* 5, no. 4 (December 1998): 433–55, and Keith Topper, "Not So Trifling Nuances: Pierre Bourdieu, Symbolic Violence, and the Perversions of Democracy," *Constellations* 8, no. 1 (March 2001): 30–56.

2. Bourdieu, *Interventions, 1961–2001. Science sociale et action politique*, ed. Franck Poupeau and Thierry Discepolo (Marseille & Montréal: Agone, Comeau & Nadeau, 2002), 361–64.

3. Bourdieu, "Erinnerung ohne Gedanken," in *Von Vergessen vom Gedenken*, ed. H.L. Arnold Sauzay and R. von Tadden (Göttingen: Wellstein, 1995), 42–47.

4. See Bourdieu, *Le Bal des célibataires. Crise de la société paysanne en Béarn* (Paris: Seuil/Points, 2002), for an ethnographic portrait and analysis of the social structure and contradictions of his native Béarn, and Durkheim, *Lettres à Marcel Mauss* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), for abundant testimony to the centrality of Republican socialism to the formation of the French school of sociology.

5. Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990 [1987], rev. ed. 1994), 13.

6. Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le Déracinement. La crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964); Bourdieu, *Interventions*, 17–42.

7. *Ibid.*, 165–69.

8. Bourdieu et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999 [1993]).

9. This synergistic relation between scientific inquiry and political activism is demonstrated by Poupeau and Discepolo's article in this issue, but more so by a close reading of the volume of Bourdieu's collected public interventions from 1961 to 2001 they skillfully edited, *Interventions*.

10. In what follows, I signpost the main thematic nodes in Bourdieu's treatment of democratic politics, with references only to pivotal pieces, without tracing the numerous transversal queries that tie them tightly together. All citations to Bourdieu's texts are my translations from the French.

11. Bourdieu with Luc Boltanski, "La production de l'idéologie dominante," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 2/3 (June 1976): 4. Here Bourdieu formulated within a Durkheimian framework an argument made famous later within the Marxist lineage by Nicholas Abercrombie, Bryan S. Turner, and Stephen Hill in *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (London: Routledge, 1984).

12. Bourdieu, "Questions de politique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 16 (June 1977): 64.

13. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]).

14. Ibid., 537.

15. Bourdieu, "Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field," *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. and intr. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991 [1982, this essay 1981]). It is not by happenstance that this article was sandwiched between those on the scientific field and the religious field. For Bourdieu, these three universes are similar in that they are based on a radical disjuncture between the profane and the specialists who claim monopoly over the manipulation of three essential goods: scientific truth, spiritual salvation, and civic virtue.

16. "By a strange irony, the concentration of political capital is never so great . . . as in the case of those parties that have for goal to struggle against the concentration of economic capital." Ibid., 215.

17. Ibid., 235.

18. Bourdieu, "Capital symbolique et classes sociales," *L'Arc* 72 (1978): 13–19; "Le mort saisit le vif: les relations entre l'histoire incorporée et l'histoire réifiée," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 32–33 (April–June 1980): 3–14; *Language and Symbolic Power*; "Delegation and Political Fetishism," *Thesis Eleven* 10/11 (November 1985 [1984]): 56–70 (reprinted in *In Other Words*); *Masculine Domination* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002 [1998]). An extension of Bourdieu's germinal essay on the family as the primordial political collective of modern society ("The Family as Realized Category," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 13, no. 3 (July 1996 [1993]): 9–26 (rep. in *Practical Reasons: On the Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998 [1994]))) is Remi Lenoir's provocative analysis of the historical forms of "familialism" since the Middle Ages, *Généalogie de la morale familiale* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2003).

19. Bourdieu, *Interventions*, 102.

20. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 106.

21. Ibid. and "The Mystery of the Ministry: From Particular Wills to the General Will" [2001], in this issue.

22. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 120–21.

23. Bourdieu, "Public Opinion Does Not Exist," in *Communication and Class Struggle*, ed. A. Matelart and S. Siegelau (New York: International General/IMMRC, 1979 [1971]), 224; see also "Opinion Polls: A 'Science' without a Scientist," *In Other Words* [1985].

24. The incipient conflict of legitimacy between voting and polling, and their joint opposition to street demonstration as a means of symbolic group-making, is analyzed at length by Patrick Champagne, *Faire l'opinion. Le nouveau jeu politique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1990).

25. These studies were published between 1971 and 1996 and their main results are encapsulated in *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Artistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996 [1992]), *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996 [1989]), and Bourdieu's unpublished course from the early 1990s on the invention of the state at the Collège de France.

26. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 376.

27. Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State: On the Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory* 12–1 (March 1994 [1993]): 1–19 (reprinted in *Practical Reasons*).

28. Bourdieu et al., *The Weight of the World and Interventions*, 245–52.

29. Bourdieu, "From the King's House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field" [1997], in this issue.

30. "The construction of the state goes hand in hand with the construction of a sort of shared historical transcendental that, as a result of a protracted process of embodiment, becomes immanent to all its 'subjects.' Through the frameworks it imposes upon practices, the state institutes and inculcates common symbolic forms of thought, statist forms of classification. . . . The state thereby creates the conditions of an immediate orchestration of habitus that is itself the foundation of a consensus on this set of shared self-evidences constitutive of common sense." Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000 [1997]), 175.

31. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 558–59.

32. For a sample from among the issues of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* published in the past decade alone, see "Politiques" (91–92, March 1992), "Literature and Politics" (111–112,

March 1996), “Violences” (120, December 1997), and “Votes” (140, December 2001); and on the state more specifically, “The History of the State” (116–117, March 1997), “Genesis of the Modern State” (118, June 1997), “From Social State to Penal State” (124, September 1998), and “State Science” (133, June 2000). The varied uses of Bourdieu’s theory of the political field include David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt on democratization and economic change in post-Soviet Eastern Europe (*Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)), Raka Ray on women’s movement in urban India (*Fields of Protest: Women’s Movements in India* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)), Robert W. Hefner on Islam and democracy in Indonesia (*Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)), Gil Eyal on the breakup of Czechoslovakia (*The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From the Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003)), and Georgi Derluguian on nationalist rebellion in Chechnya (*Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus* (London: Verso, 2004)).

33. See, among influential books, Michel Offerlé, *Les Partis politiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987); Bernard Pudal, *Prendre parti. Pour une sociologie historique du PCF* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1989); Bernard Lacroix and Jacques Lagroye, eds., *Le Président de la République* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1992); Daniel Gaxie, *Le Cens caché. Inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1978); *Le Vote et la vertu. Comment les Français sont devenus électeurs* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1992); Loïc Blondiaux, *La Fabrique de l’opinion. Une histoire sociale des sondages* (Paris: Seuil, 1998); Pierre Favre, ed., *La Manifestation* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1990); Michel Dobry, *Sociologie des crises politiques* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1992); and Erik Neveu, *Sociologie des mouvements sociaux* (Paris: Montchrestien, 1996). Consult also the thematic section on Bourdieu and political science edited by Bertrand Voutrat, “Débat: À propos de Pierre Bourdieu,” *Revue Suisse de science politique* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 101–50.

34. See esp. Bourdieu, *Interventions*.

35. This is particularly visible in the case of publishing and the media: Bourdieu’s sociology of the fields of cultural production, *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), was key to his successfully launching a publishing house, *Raisons d’agir Editions*, and to the efficacy of his critique of journalism (*On Television* was on the bestseller lists for months due to the furious reactions of journalists against it, which made them active propagandists of an analysis they deemed sacrilegious).

36. Bourdieu and Wacquant, “The Cunning of Imperialist Reason,” *Theory, Culture, and Society* 16, no. 1 (February 1999 [1998]): 41–57. See also the double issue of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* on that theme (121–22, March 1998), and Yves Dezalay and Brian G. Garth’s multidisciplinary study of the packaging and global export of US conceptions of “rule of law” and “civil society” by philanthropic foundations and international agencies, *Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

37. Bourdieu, “Les conditions sociales de la circulation des idées,” *Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte* 14, no. 1/2 (1990): 1–10; *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2* (London: Verso, 2003 [2001]); *Interventions*, 443–50, 457–75.

38. Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism* (London: Pluto, 1998 [1996]).

39. For a historical dissection of the crystallization of the mental and social category of “intellectual” around the Dreyfus Affair and of the social roots of its endurance informed by the theory of field, read Christophe Charle, *Naissance des “intellectuels”* (Paris: Minit, 1990); on Bourdieu’s reactivation of the Zola model, read Jean-Philippe Mathy, “The Prophetic Exigency: Zola, Bourdieu and the Memory of Dreyfusism,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 24, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2000): 321–40.

40. Bourdieu “The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World,” *Telos* 81 (Fall 1989): 99–110; *The Rules of Art*, 339–48.

41. Poupeau and Discepolo, “Scholarship with Commitment.”

42. Bourdieu, *Propos sur le champ politique* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000), 99–107, *Firing Back*, 363.

43. *Pascalian Meditations*, 215.

44. Bourdieu, “Le mort saisit le vif” and *Pascalian Meditations*, 216.

45. It is this primacy of the unconscious consent to the injunctions of the social world via the embodiment of extant relations of domination that led Bourdieu “little by little to banish the use of the word ‘ideology’” (*ibid.*, 216). The sociologist gives for illustration the incarnation of nationalism and the “mortal passions of all racisms (of ethnicity, gender, or class)” which are “no less strong among the dominated than among the dominant” (*ibid.*, 214–17). Yet the paradigm of the somatization of symbolic violence for Bourdieu is masculine domination.

46. *Ibid.*, 216, 276–78.

47. *Ibid.*, 280–84.

48. Compare Bourdieu’s treatment of the “question of justification” and the “symbolic effects of capital” (*Practical Reasons*, ch. 4 and *Pascalian Meditations*, 279–88) with Charles Taylor and Amy Gutman’s *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Seyla Benhabib’s *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth’s *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003).

49. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 83.

50. Bourdieu, *In Other Words*, 178–84. Bourdieu’s critique of Habermas’s conception of communicative action and ethics would seem to apply readily to political theorists of recognition and advocates of multiculturalism; see *Pascalian Meditations*, 80–88.