The single greatest political transformation of the post-civil rights era in America is the joint rolling back of the stingy social state and rolling out of the gargantuan penal state that have remade the country’s stratification, cities, and civic culture, and are recasting the very character of “blackness” itself. Together, these two concurrent and convergent thrusts have effectively redrawn the perimeter, mission, and modalities of action of public authority when it comes to managing the deprived and stigmatized populations stuck at the bottom of the class, ethnic, and urban hierarchy. The concomitant downsizing of the welfare wing and up-sizing of the criminal justice wing of the American state have not been driven by raw trends in poverty and crime, but fueled by a politics of resentment toward categories deemed undeserving and unruly. Chief among those stigmatized populations are the public-aid recipients and the street criminals framed as the two demonic figureheads of the “black underclass” that came to dominate the journalistic, scholarly, and policy debate on the plight of urban America in the revanchist decades that digested the civil disorders of the 1960s and the stagflation of the 1970s, and then witnessed the biggest carceral boom in world history.

In this article, I show that the stupendous expansion and intensification of the activities of the American police, criminal courts, and prison over the past thirty years have been finely targeted, first by class, second by race, and third by place, leading not to mass incarceration but to the hyperincarceration of (sub)proletarian African American men from the imploding ghetto. This triple selectivity reveals that the building of the hyperactive and hypertrophic penal state that has made the United States world champion in incarceration is at once a delayed reaction to the civil rights movement and the ghetto riots of the mid-1960s and a disciplinary instrument unfurled to foster the neoliberal revolution by helping to impose insecure labor as the normal horizon of work for the unskilled fractions of the postindustrial laboring class. The double coupling of the prison with the dilapidated hyperghetto, on the one side, and with supervisory workfare, on the other, is not a moral dilemma—as recently argued by Glenn Loury in his Tanner Lecture—but a political quandary calling for an expanded analysis of the nexus of class inequality, ethnic stigma, and the state in the age of social insecurity. Reversing the racialized penalization of
poverty in the crumbling inner city requires a different policy response than mass incarceration would and calls for an analysis of the political obstacles to this response, which must go beyond “trickle-down” penal reform to encompass the multifaceted role of the state in producing and entrenching marginality.

The tale of the unexpected and exponential growth of jails and prisons over the past three decades in America after a half-century of carceral stability has often been told. But the raw increase of the population behind bars—from about 380,000 in 1975 to 2 million in 2000 and some 2.4 million today (counting juveniles and persons held in police lockups, who are not registered by official correctional statistics)—is only part of the story of the multisided expansion of the penal state.

Four distinctive yet submerged dimensions of America’s punitive turn after the close of the Fordist era form the backdrop to my analysis of the deployment of the disciplinary tentacles of the state toward the poor.

First, this phenomenal increase is remarkable for having been fueled, not by the lengthening of the average sentence as in previous periods of carceral inflation, but primarily by the surge in jail and prison admissions. Thus the number of people committed to state and federal penitentiaries by the courts ballooned from 159,000 in 1980 to 665,000 in 1997 (accounting for more than 80 percent of inmate growth during that period) before stabilizing at about a half-million annually after 2002. This surge sharply differentiates the United States from Western European countries, most of which have also witnessed a steady, if comparatively modest, rise in incarceration over the past two decades, but one where growing stock is not due to increases in flow. A major contributor to this “vertical” growth of the carceral system in America is the steep escalation in the volume of persons arrested by the police and the vastly enlarged role assumed by jails as frontline dams of social disorders in the city. This police hyperactivity has been disproportionate to and disjoined from trends in crime. One example: in New York City, under the campaign of “zero tolerance” promoted by then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the number of arrests increased by 40 percent between 1993 and 1998 to top 376,000 while crime decreased by 54 percent to reach 323,000, meaning that the police arrested more persons than it recorded offenses by the end of that period, compared to half as many at the start. Even though a growing share of these arrests were abusive and did not lead to charges, admissions to jail rose by one-fourth, causing rampant congestion and daily pandemonium in the city’s custodial facilities.

As a result of intensified policing coupled with a rising propensity to confine miscreants, American jails have become gargantuan operations processing a dozen million bodies each year nationwide, as well as huge drains on the budgets of counties and pivotal institutions in the lives of the (sub)proletariat of the big cities. Indeed, because they treat vastly more people than do prisons, under conditions that are more chaotic due to high turnover, endemic overcrowding, population heterogeneity, and the administrative shift to bare-bones managerialism (the two top priorities of jail wardens are to minimize violent incidents and to hold down staff overtime), jails create more social disruption and family turmoil at the bottom of the urban order than do prisons. Yet they have remained largely under the radar of researchers and policy analysts alike.

Second, the vertical rise of the penal system has been exceeded by its “hori-
horizontal” spread: the ranks of those kept in the long shadow of the prison via probation and parole have swelled even more than the population under lock, to about 4 million and 1 million, respectively. As a result, the total population under criminal justice supervision bloated from 1.8 million in 1980 to 6.4 million by 2000 and 7.4 million in 2007. Probation and parole should be incorporated into the debate on the penal state, not only because they concern a much larger population than that of convicts (in 1998, eleven states each held in excess of 100,000 probationers under their heel, more than France did, with 87,000), but also because both are more likely to lead (back) to imprisonment than not: two in five probationers and six in ten parolees who exited this status in 1997 were returned to custody within three years, either because they had committed a new offense or because they had violated one or another administrative condition of their release (failing an alcohol test or losing a job, missing an appointment with their parole officer, or traveling outside of their county of assignment without permission, for example). The purpose and functioning of parole have changed drastically over the past thirty years, from spring toward rehabilitation to penal trap, so that parole is now properly construed as an extension of the custodial system, rather than an alternative to it.11

The reach of penal authorities has also been dramatically enlarged beyond probation and parole by the exponential growth in the size, scope, and uses of criminal justice databases that, as of 2000, contained roughly sixty million files on an estimated thirty-five million individuals. Novel panoptic measures include the diffusion of official “rap sheets” through the Internet, the routinization of “background checks” by employers and realtors, the spread of public notification statutes (and related laws seeking to expurgate specific categories of convicts, such as sex offenders, from the social body), and the shift from old-style fingerprints and mug shots to DNA prints coordinated by the FBI.12 These institutional tentacles, and the routine practices of profiling, surveillance, and enclosure at a distance that they permit, severely curtail the life chances of former convicts and their families by stretching the effects of judicial stigma on the labor, housing, and marital markets as well as into daily life.13 Legislators have further amplified these sanctions by adding a raft of restrictions on the access of ex-felons to public services, privileges, and benefits, from public housing and public employment to college scholarships, parenting, and voting rights.14

Third, the advent of penal “big government” was made possible by astonishing increases in funding and personnel. Prison and jail expenditures in America jumped from $7 billion in 1980 to $57 billion in 2000 and exceeded $70 billion in 2007, even as crime first stagnated and then declined steadily after 1993. (Meanwhile, criminal justice expenditures grew sevenfold, from $33 billion to $216 billion.) This budgetary boom of 660 percent – amounting to a veritable carceral Marshall Plan during a period when successive administrations proclaimed to rein in public spending – financed the infusion of an additional one million criminal justice staff, which has made corrections the third largest employer in the nation, behind only Manpower Inc. and Wal-Mart, with a monthly payroll of $2.4 billion.

The upsizing of the carceral function of government has been rigorously proportional to the downsizing of its welfare role. In 1980, the country spent three times as much on its two main assistance programs ($11 billion for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and $10 billion for food stamps) than on corrections ($7 billion). By 1996, when “welfare reform” replaced the right to public assistance by the obligation to accept insecure employment as a condition of support, the carceral budget came to double the sums allocated to either AFDC or food stamps ($54 billion compared to $20 billion and $27 billion, respectively). Similarly, during the 1990s alone, Washington cut funding for public housing by $17 billion (a reduction of 61 percent) and boosted corrections by $19 billion (an increase of 171 percent), effectively making the construction of prisons the nation’s main housing program for the poor.

Fourth, the building of America’s gigantic penal state is a nationwide endeavor and a bipartisan achievement. Many scholars have rightly stressed that the United States does not have a criminal justice system so much as a loose patchwork of independent jurisdictions beset by administrative fragmentation and policy dispersal bordering on incoherence. In light of wide regional and state variations, others have highlighted the role of “local political culture” and modes of “civic engagement” in determining the mix and intensity of penal sanctions. Still others have reported that Republican governors, a large African American urban population, and “a state’s religious and political culture” exert a significant influence on incarceration rates. Yet for all these and other geographic disparities and peculiarities, it remains that, over the past thirty-odd years, penal escalation has left no corner of the country untouched and has brought about de facto unification in the aggressive deployment of punishment. Aside from Maine and Kansas, all states saw their correctional counts grow by more than 50 percent between 1985 and 1995, at the peak of the carceral boom. Everywhere the ideal of rehabilitation has been abandoned or drastically downgraded, making retribution and neutralization the main practical rationale for confinement.

Increases in the civic salience of crime and distrust in government have pushed all jurisdictions toward greater punitive-ness. Moreover, policy control over criminal justice has migrated to the federal level, where it has grown steadily more symbolic and less substantive since the 1970s. Indeed, this national slant is one of the distinctive causes of the severity of the punitive turn, as it strikes at impoverished minority districts in the city. This national trajectory has been uninterrupted by changes in political majority in statehouses, Congress, and the White House, as both parties have reflexively supported penal activism and expanded incarceration. Republicans will claim that they are “tougher on crime,” but Democratic majorities have run up the carceral tab in California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York. It was a Democratic president, Jimmy Carter (former governor of Georgia, one of the country’s most repressive states), who jump-started America’s great “carceral leap forward.” And another Democratic president (and former governor of another superpunitive state, Arkansas), Bill Clinton, who pushed for the most costly crime bill in world history (the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994), oversaw the single largest expansion of incarceration in the annals of democratic societies: Clinton tallied an increase of 465,000 convicts for an added $15 billion, compared to 288,000 convicts for a boost of $8 billion for Ronald Reagan.

The foregoing indicates that the footprint of the penal state on the national body is much broader and heavier than usually
depicted. At the same time, it is also considerably more pointed than conveyed by the current debate. It has become conventional among justice activists, journalists, and analysts of the U.S. carceral scene to designate the unprecedented and unparalleled expansion of the American correctional system at the close of the twentieth century as “mass incarceration.”22 The term was (re)introduced in the national prison debate in the late 1990s (until then, it had been used to refer to the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps during World War II) and was soon codified by David Garland at the interdisciplinary conference on “Mass Incarceration: Social Causes and Consequences,” held at New York University in 2000, which boosted research on the topic.23 The designation of mass incarceration is intuitively appealing because it helps spotlight the outlier status of the United States on the world scene, dramatize the condition at hand, and thus draw scholarly and public attention to it. But, much as it has been useful in terms of mobilizing intellectual and civic resources, the notion obscures signal features of the phenomenon.

Mass incarceration is a mischaracterization of what is better termed hyperincarceration. This is not a mere terminological quibble, for the change in wording points to a different depiction of the punitive turn, which leads to a different causal model and thence to different policy prescriptions. Mass incarceration suggests that confinement concerns large swaths of the citizenry (as with the mass media, mass culture, and mass unemployment), implying that the penal net has been flung far and wide across social and physical space. This is triply inaccurate. First, the prevalence of penal confinement in the United States, while extreme by international standards, can hardly be said to concern the masses.

Indeed, a rate of 0.75 percent compares quite favorably with the incidence of such woes as latent tuberculosis infection (estimated at 4.2 percent) and severe alcohol dependency (3.81 percent), ailments which no one would seriously contend have reached mass proportions in the United States.24 Next, the expansion and intensification of the activities of the police, courts, and prison over the past quarter-century have been anything but broad and indiscriminate.25 They have been finely targeted, first by class, second by that disguised brand of ethnocity called race, and third by place.

This cumulative targeting has led to the hyperincarceration of one particular category, lower-class African American men trapped in the crumbling ghetto, while leaving the rest of society – including, most remarkably, middle- and upper-class African Americans – practically untouched. Third, and more important still, this triple selectivity is a constitutive property of the phenomenon: had the penal state been rolled out indiscriminately by policies resulting in the capture of vast numbers of whites and well-to-do citizens, capsizing their families and decimating their neighborhoods as it has for inner-city African Americans, its growth would have been speedily derailed and eventually stopped by political counteraction. “Mass” incarceration is socially tolerable and therefore workable as public policy only so long as it does not reach the masses: it is a figure of speech, which hides the multiple filters that operate to point the penal dagger.26

Class, not race, is the first filter of selection for incarceration. The welcome focus on race, crime, and punishment that has dominated discussions of the prison boom has obliterated the fact that inmates are first and foremost poor people. Indeed, this monotonic class recruitment is a constant of penal history since the
invention of houses of correction in the late sixteenth century and a fact confirmed by the annals of U.S. incarceration. Consider the social profile of the clientele of the nation’s jails – the gateway into America’s carceral archipelago. This clientele is drawn overwhelmingly from the most precarious fractions of the urban working class: fewer than half of inmates held a full-time job at the time of arraignment and two-thirds issue from households with an annual income coming to less than half the “poverty line”; only 13 percent have some postsecondary education (compared to a national rate above one-half); 60 percent did not grow up with both parents, including 14 percent raised in foster homes or orphanages; and every other detainee has had a member of his family behind bars. The regular clients of America’s jails suffer from acute material insecurity, cultural deprivation, and social denudement – only 16 percent of them are married, compared to 58 percent for men of their age bracket nationwide. They also include disproportionate numbers of the homeless, the mentally ill, the alcohol- and drug-addicted, and the severely handicapped: nearly one in four suffers from a physical, psychic, or emotional ailment serious enough to hamper his or her ability to work. And they come mostly from deprived and stigmatized neighborhoods that have been devastated by the double retrenchment of the formal labor market and the welfare state from the urban core. Conversely, very few members of the middle and upper classes ever sojourn at the “Graybar hotel,” especially for committing the minor to middling crimes that account for the bulk of prison convictions. (In 1997, 11 percent of new court commitments to state penitentiaries were for public order offenses, 30 percent for narcotics convictions, and 28 percent for property crimes.)

Martha Stewart and Bernie Madoff are but spectacular exceptions that spotlight this stringent class rule. Race comes second. But the ethnic transformation of America’s prison has been at once more dramatic and more puzzling than generally recognized. To start, the ethnoracial makeup of convicts has completely flip-flopped in four decades, turning over from 70 percent white and 30 percent “others” at the close of World War II to 70 percent African American and Latino versus 30 percent white by century’s end. This inversion, which accelerated after the mid-1970s, is all the more stunning when the criminal population has both shrunk and become whiter during that period: the share of African Americans among individuals arrested by the police for the four most serious violent offenses (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) dropped from 51 percent in 1973 to 43 percent in 1996, and it continued to decline steadily for each of those four crimes until at least 2006.

Next, the rapid “blackening” of the prison population even as serious crime “whitened” is due exclusively to the astronomical increase in the incarceration rates of lower-class African Americans. In his book Punishment and Inequality in America, sociologist Bruce Western produces a stunning statistic: whereas the cumulative risk of imprisonment for African American males without a high-school diploma tripled between 1979 and 1999, to reach the astonishing rate of 59 percent, the lifetime chance of serving time for African American men with some college education decreased from 6 percent to 5 percent. Here again, the media melodrama around the arrest of Harvard University star professor Henry Louis Gates in Summer 2009 has hidden the fact that middle- and upper-class African Americans are better off under the present penal regime than they were thr...
ty years ago. It has played to the national obsession for the black-white duality, which obfuscates the fact that class disproportionality inside each ethnic category is greater than the racial disproportionality between them: African American men are eight times more likely to sojourn behind bars than European American men (7.9 percent versus 1.0 percent in 2000), but the lifetime probability of serving time in prison for African American males who did not complete their secondary education is twelve times that for African American males who went to college (58.9 percent versus 4.9 percent), whereas that class gap among white men stands at sixteen to one (11.2 percent versus 0.7 percent). The fact that these ratios were considerably lower two decades ago for both African Americans and European Americans (of the order of one to three and one to eight, respectively) confirms that enlarged imprisonment has struck very selectively by class inside of race, which again refutes the diagnosis of a “mass” phenomenon.

How was such double, nested selectivity achieved? How is it possible that criminal laws ostensibly written to avoid class and color bias would lead to throwing so many (sub)proletarian African American men under lock, and not other African American men? The class gradient in racialized imprisonment was obtained by targeting one particular place: the remnants of the dark ghetto. I insist here on the word remnants, because the ghetto of old, which held in its grip a unified, if stratified, African American community, is no more. The communal Black Belt of the Fordist era, described by a long lineage of distinguished African American sociologists, from W. E. B. Du Bois and E. Franklin Frazier to Drake and Cayton to Kenneth Clark, imploded in the 1960s, to be replaced by a dual and decentered structure of seclusion composed of a degraded hyperghetto doubly segregated by race and class, on the one hand, and the satellite African American middle-class districts that mushroomed in the adjacent areas vacated by the mass exodus of whites to the suburbs, on the other.

But to detect the tightening linkage between the decaying ghetto and the booming prison requires that one effects two analytic moves. First, one must break out of the narrow ambit of the “crime and punishment” paradigm that continues to hamstring the scholarly and policy debate, in spite of its increasingly glaring inadequacy. A simple ratio suffices to demonstrate that crime cannot be the cause behind carceral hyperinflation: the number of clients of state and federal prisons boomed from 21 convicts per thousand “index crimes” in 1975 to 125 per thousand in 2005. In other words, holding the crime rate constant shows that the American penal state is six times more punitive today than it was three decades ago. Instead of getting sidetracked into investigations of the crime-punishment (dis)connection, one must recognize that the prison is not a mere technical implement of government designed to stem offending, but a core state capacity devoted to managing dispossessed and dishonored populations. Returning to the early history of the prison in the long sixteenth century readily discloses that penal bondage developed, not to fight crime, but to dramatize the authority of rulers, and to repress idleness and enforce morality among vagrants, beggars, and assorted categories cast adrift by the advent of capitalism. The rise of the prison was part and parcel of the building of the early modern state to discipline the nascent urban proletariat.
and to stage sovereignty for the benefit of the emerging citizenry. The same is true four centuries later in the dualizing metropolis of neoliberal capitalism.

A second analytic shift is needed to ferret out the causal connection between hyperghettoization and hyperincarceration: to realize that the ghetto is not a segregated quarter, a poor neighborhood, or an urban district marred by housing dilapidation, violence, vice, or disrepute, but an *instrument of ethnoracial control* in the city. Another return to social history demonstrates that a ghetto is a sociospatial contraption through which a dominant ethnic category secludes a subordinate group and restricts its life chances in order to both exploit and exclude it from the life-sphere of the dominant. Like the Jewish ghetto in Renaissance Europe, the Black Belt of the American metropolis in the Fordist age combined four elements – stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement – to permit the economic extraction and social ostracization of a population deemed congenitally inferior, defiled and defiling by virtue of its lineal connection to bondage. Succeeding chattel slavery and Jim Crow, the ghetto was the third “peculiar institution” entrusted with defining, confining, and controlling African Americans in the urban industrial order.

Penal expansion after the mid-1970s is a political response to the collapse of the ghetto. But why did the ghetto collapse? Three causal series converged to undercut the “black city within the white” that hemmed in African Americans from the 1920s to the 1960s. The first is the post-industrial economic transition that shifted employment from manufacturing to services, from central city to suburb, and from the Rustbelt to the Sunbelt and low-wage foreign countries. Together with renewed immigration, this shift made African American workers redundant and undercut the role of the ghetto as a reservoir of unskilled labor. The second cause is the political displacement provoked by the Great White Migration to the suburbs: from the 1950s to the 1970s, millions of white families fled the metropolis in reaction to the influx of African Americans from the rural South. This demographic upheaval, subsidized by the federal government and bolstered by the courts, weakened cities in the national electoral system and reduced the political pull of African Americans. The third force behind the breakdown of the ghetto as ethnoracial container is African American protest, fostered by the accumulation of social and symbolic capital correlative of ghettoization, culminating with the civil rights legislation, the budding of Black Power activism, and the eruption of urban riots that rocked the country between 1964 and 1968.

Unlike Jim Crow, then, the ghetto was not dismantled by forceful government action. It was left to crumble onto itself, trapping lower-class African Americans in a vortex of unemployment, poverty, and crime abetted by the joint withdrawal of the wage-labor market and the welfare state, while the growing African American middle class achieved limited social and spatial separation by colonizing the districts adjacent to the historic Black Belt. As the ghetto lost its economic function of labor extraction and proved unable to ensure ethnoracial closure, the prison was called on to help contain a dishonored population widely viewed as deviant, destitute, and dangerous. This coupling occurred because, as previously suggested, ghetto and prison belong to the same organizational genus, namely, *institutions of forced confinement*: the ghetto is a sort of “ethnoracial prison” in the city, while the prison functions in the manner of a “judicial ghetto” at large. Both are charged with enfolding a stig-
matized category so as to defuse the material and/or symbolic threat it poses for the broader society from which it has been extruded.

To be sure, the structural homology and functional surrogacy of ghetto and prison do not mandate that the former be replaced by or coupled with the latter. For that to happen, specific policy choices had to be made, implemented, and supported. This support sprang from the fearful reaction of whites to the urban riots and related racial upheavals of the 1960s and from the rising political resentment generated by government powerlessness in the face of the stagflation of 1970s and the subsequent spread of social insecurity along three tacks. First, middle-class whites accelerated their exodus out of the capsizing cities, which enabled the federal government to dismantle programs essential to the succor of inner-city residents. Second, working-class whites joined their middle-class brethren in turning against the welfare state to demand that public aid be curtailed—leading to the “end of welfare as we know it” in 1996. Third, whites across the class spectrum allied to offer ardent political backing for the “law and order” measures that primed the penal pump and harnessed it to the hyperghetto. The meeting ground and theater of these three political thrusts was the “revanchist city” in which increasing inequality, diffusing social precariousness, and festering marginality fed citizens’ rancor over the alleged excessive generosity of welfare and leniency of criminal justice toward poor African Americans.

Two trains of converging changes then bolstered the knitting of the hyperghetto and the prison into a carceral mesh en-snaring a population of lower-class African Americans rejected by the deregulated labor market and the dereliction of public institutions in the inner city. On the one side, the ghetto was “prisonized” as its class composition became monotonously poor, its internal social relations grew stamped by distrust and fear, and its indigenous organizations waned to be replaced by the social control institutions of the state. On the other side, the prison was “ghettoized” as rigid racial partition came to pervade custodial facilities; the predatory culture of the street supplanted the “convict code” that had traditionally organized the “inmate society”; rehabilitation was abandoned in favor of neutralization; and the stigma of criminal conviction was deepened and diffused in ways that make it akin to racial dishonor. The resulting symbiosis between hyperghetto and prison not only perpetuates the socioeconomic marginality and symbolic taint of the African American sub-proletariat, feeding the runaway growth of the carceral system. It also plays a key role in the revamping of “race” by associating blackness with devious violence and dangerousness, the redefinition of the citizenry via the production of a racialized public culture of vilification of criminals, and the construction of a post-Keynesian state that replaces the social-welfare treatment of poverty with its punitive containment.

Yet the tightening nexus between the hyperghetto and the prison does not tell the whole story of the frenetic growth of the penal institution in America after the civil rights revolution. In *Punishing the Poor*, I show that the unleashing of a voracious prison apparatus after the mid-1970s partakes of a broader restructuring of the state tending to criminalize poverty and its consequences so as to impress insecure, underpaid jobs as the modal employment situation of the unskilled segments of the postindustrial proletariat. The sudden hypertrophy of the penal state was thus matched and
complemented by the planned atrophy of the social state, culminating with the 1996 law on Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity, which replaced the right to “welfare” with the obligation of “workfare.” Each in its fashion, workfare and prisonfare respond, not just to the crisis of the ghetto as a device for the sociospatial seclusion of African Americans, but to the repudiation of the Fordist wage-work compact and of the Keynesian social compromise of the postwar decades. Together, they ensnare the marginal populations of the metropolis in a carceral-assistential net designed to steer them toward deregulated employment through moral retraining and material suasion and, if they prove too recalcitrant and disruptive, to warehouse them in the devastated core of the urban Black Belt and in the penitentiaries that have become its distant yet direct satellites.

The workfare revolution and the penal explosion are the two sides of the same historical coin, two facets of the reengineering and masculinizing of the state on the way to the establishment of a novel political regime that may be characterized as liberal-paternalist: it practices laissez-faire at the top, toward corporations and the privileged, but it is intrusive and disciplinary at the bottom, when it comes to dealing with the consequences of social disinvestment and economic deregulation for the lower class and its territories. And, just as racial stigma was pivotal to the junction of hyperghetto and prison, the taint of “blackness” was epicentral to the restrictive and punitive overhaul of social welfare at century’s end. In the wake of the ghetto mutinies of the 1960s, the diffusion of blackened images of crime fueled rising hostility toward criminals and fostered (white) demands for expansive prison policies narrowly aimed at retribution and neutralization.

During the same years, the spread of blackened images of urban destitution and dependency similarly fostered mounting resentment toward public aid, bolstering (white) support for restrictive welfare measures centered on deterrence and compulsion. Race turns out to be the symbolic linchpin that coordinated the synergistic transformation of these two sectors of public policy toward the poor.

Again, like the joining of hyperghetto and prison, this second institutional pairing feeding carceral growth can be better understood by paying attention to the structural, functional, and cultural similarities between workfare and prisonfare as “people-processing organizations” targeted on problem populations and neighborhoods. It was tightened by the transformation of welfare in a punitive direction and by the expansion of the penal system to “treat” more and more of the traditional clientele of welfare. Both programs of state action are narrowly directed at the bottom of the class and ethnic hierarchy; both effectively assume that their recipients are “guilty until proven innocent” and that their conduct must be closely supervised as well as rectified by restrictive and coercive measures; and both use deterrence and stigma to achieve behavioral modification.

In the era of hypermobile capital and fragmented wage-work, the monitoring of the precarious segments of the working class is no longer handled solely by the maternal social arm of the welfare state, as portrayed by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward in their classic 1971 study Regulating the Poor. It entails a double regulation through the virile and controlling arms of workfare and prisonfare acting in unison. This dynamic coupling of social and penal policy at the bottom of the class and ethnic structure operates
through a familiar division of labor between the sexes: the public aid bureaucracy, reconverted into an administrative springboard to subpoverty employment, takes up the task of inculcating the duty of working for work’s sake to poor women (and indirectly to their children), while the penal quartet formed by the police, the court, the prison, and the probation or parole officer shoulders the mission of taming their men – that is, the boyfriends or husbands, brothers, and sons of these poor women. Welfare provision and criminal justice are animated by the same punitive and paternalist philosophy that stresses the “individual responsibility” of the “client”; they both rely on case supervision and bureaucratic surveillance, deterrence and stigma, and graduated sanctions aimed at modifying behavior to enforce compliance with work and civility; and they reach publics of roughly comparable size. In 2001, 2.1 million households received Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, for a total of some 6 million beneficiaries, while the carceral population topped 2.1 million and the stock under criminal justice supervision surpassed 6.5 million.

In addition, welfare recipients and inmates have nearly identical social profiles and extensive mutual ties of descent and alliance confirming that they are the two gendered components of the same population. Both categories live below 50 percent of the federal poverty line (for one-half and two-thirds of them, respectively); both are disproportionately African American and Hispanic (37 percent and 18 percent versus 41 percent and 19 percent); the majority did not finish high school; and many suffer from serious physical and mental disabilities limiting their workforce participation (44 percent of AFDC mothers as against 37 percent of jail inmates). And they are closely bound to one another by kin and marital and social bonds, reside overwhelmingly in the same impoverished households and barren neighborhoods, and face the same bleak life horizon at the bottom of the class and ethnic structure. This intertwining indicates that we cannot hope to untie the knot of class, race, and imprisonment, and thus explain hyperincarceration, if we do not re-link prisonfare and workfare, which in turn implies that we must bring the social wing of the state and its transformations into our analytic and policy purview.

Revanchism as public policy toward the dispossessed has thrust the country into a historical cul-de-sac, as the double coupling of hyperghettoization and hyperincarceration, on the one hand, and workfare and prisonfare, on the other, damages both society and the state. For society, the spiral of penal escalation has become self-reinforcing as well as self-defeating: the carceral Moloch actively destabilizes the precarious fractions of the postindustrial proletariat it strikes with special zeal, truncates the life options of its members, and further despoils inner-city neighborhoods, thereby reproducing the very social disorders, material insecurity, and symbolic stain it is supposed to alleviate. As a result, the population behind bars has kept on growing even as the overall crime rate dropped precipitously for some fifteen years, yielding a paradoxical pattern of carceral levitation. For the state, the penalization of poverty turns out to be financially ruinous, as it competes with, and eventually consumes, the funds and staff needed to sustain essential public services such as schooling, health, transportation, and social protection. Moreover, the punitive and panoptic logic that propels criminal justice seeps into and erodes the shielding capacities of the welfare sector, for instance by inflecting the...
practices of child protective services in ways that turn them into adjuncts of the penal apparatus. It similarly undercuts the educational springboard, as depleted inner-city schools serving a clientele roiled by mass unemployment and penal disruption come to prioritize and manage issues of student discipline through a prism of crime control. Lastly, the law-and-order guignol diverts the attention of elected officials and saps the energy of bureaucratic managers charged with handling the problem populations and territories of the dualizing city.

If the diagnosis of the rise of the penal state in America sketched here is correct, and hyperincarceration proceeding along steep gradients of class, race, and space – rather than mass incarceration – is the offshoot of a novel government of social insecurity installed to absorb the shock of the crash of the ghetto and normalize precarious wage labor, then policies aimed at shrinking the carceral state must effectively reverse revanchism. They must go well beyond criminal justice reform to encompass the gamut of government programs that collectively set the life chances of the poor, and whose concurrent turnaround toward restriction and discipline after the mid-1970s have boosted the incidence, intensity, and duration of marginality at the bottom of the class and ethnic order.

A variety of cogent proposals for reducing America’s overreliance on confinement to check the reverberations of urban dispossession and dishonor have been put forward on the penal front over the past decade. These proposals range from the renewal of intermediate sanctions, the diversion of low-level drug offenders, the abolition of mandatory sentencing, and the generalized reduction of the length of prison terms, to the reform of parole revocation, the incorporation of fiscal and social impacts into judicial proceedings, and the promotion of restorative justice. Whatever the technical means chosen, achieving sustained carceral deflation will require insulating judicial and correctional professionals from the converging pressures of the media and politicians and rehabilitating rehabilitation through a public campaign debunking the neoconservative myth that “nothing works” when it comes to reforming offenders.

Deep and broad justice reform is urgently needed to reduce the astronomical financial costs, skewed social and administrative burdens, and rippling criminogenic effects of continued hyperincarceration. But generic measures to diminish the size and reach of the prison across the board will leave largely untouched the sprouting epicenter of carceral growth – that is, the urban wastelands where race, class, and the penal state meet and mesh – unless they are combined with a concerted attack on labor degradation and social desolation in the decaying hyperghetto. For that to happen, the downsizing of the penal wing must be accompanied by the reconstruction of the economic and social capacities of the state and by their active deployment in and around the devastated districts of the segregated metropolis. The programmed dereliction of public institutions in the inner city must be remedied through massive investment in schools, social services, health care, and unfettered access to drug and alcohol rehabilitation. A Works Progress Administration-style public works program aimed at the vestiges of the historic Black Belt would help at once to rebuild its decrepit infrastructure, to improve housing conditions, and to offer economic sustenance and civic incorporation to local residents.

In sum, the diagnosis of hyperincarceration implies that puncturing America’s

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bloated and voracious penal state will take more than a full-bore political commitment to fighting social inequality and ethnic marginality through progressive and inclusive government programs on the economic, social, and justice fronts. It will necessitate also a spatially targeted policy to break the noxious nexus now binding hyperghettoization, restrictive workfare, and expansive prisonfare in the racialized urban core.

ENDNOTES


2 See Neil Smith for a stimulating discussion of the notion of revanche as an extended and multiform “visceral reaction in the public discourse against the liberalism of the post-1960s period and an all-out attack on the social policy structure that emanated from the New Deal and the immediate postwar era”; Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (New York: Routledge, 1996), 42. See also Michael Flamm for a painstaking account of how the conflation of racial tumult, antiwar protest, civil disorder, and street crime laid the social foundation for the political demand for “law and order” in the wake of the class and racial dislocations of the 1960s; Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).


6 Wacquant, Punishing the Poor, chap. 4–5.


9 The sheer scale of American jails puts them in a class of their own. In 2000, the three largest custodial complexes in the Western world were the jails of Los Angeles (23,000 inmates), New York (18,000), and Chicago (10,000). By contrast, the largest penitentiary center in Europe, the Fleury-Mérogis prison just south of Paris, held 3,900 and is considered grotesquely oversized by European standards.

10 The last close-up study of the daily functioning of a big-city jail and its impact on the urban poor, John Irwin’s fine ethnography of San Francisco’s jail, dates from thirty years ago. See John Irwin, The Jail: Managing the Underclass in American Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).


12 The national DNA database from crime scenes, persons “known to the police,” and (former) convicts compiled by the FBI (under the Combined DNA Index System [CODIS]
program) more than doubled over the past five years alone to reach eight million offender profiles. Its explosive expansion, fed by technological innovation and organizational imperatives, is springing a new “racialized dragnet” thrown primarily at lower-class African American men due to their massive overrepresentation among persons stopped by police; Troy Duster, “The Exponential Growth of National and State DNA Databases: ‘Cold Hits’ and a Newly Combustible Intersection of Genomics, Forensics and Race,” paper presented to the CSSI, University of California, Berkeley, February 24, 2010.


21 “The war on crime – with its constituent imagery that melded the burning cities of the 1960s urban riots with the face of [Willie] Horton as (every) black man, murderer, rapist of a white woman – remade party affiliations and then remade the parties themselves, as the war came to be embraced and stridently promoted by Republicans and Democrats alike”; Mary Louise Frampton, Ian Haney-López, and Jonathan Simon, eds., After the War on Crime: Race, Democracy, and a New Reconstruction (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 7.


25 To be sure, David Garland singles out two “essential features” that define mass incarceration: “sheer numbers” (that is, “a rate of imprisonment and a size of prison population that is markedly above the historical and comparative norm for societies of this type”) and “the social concentration of mass imprisonment’s effects” (“when it becomes the imprisonment of whole groups of the population,” in this case “young black males in large urban centers”); Garland, *Mass Imprisonment*, 5–6. But it is not clear why the first property would not suffice to characterize the phenomenon, nor what “markedly above” entails. Next, there is a logical contradiction between the two features of mass reach and concentrated impact (no other mass phenomenon “beneﬁts” a narrow and well-bounded population). Lastly, Bernard Harcourt has pointed out that the United States had rates of forcible custody exceeding 600 per 100,000 residents from 1938 to 1962, if statistics on penal confinement and mental asylums are merged; Bernard Harcourt, “From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution,” *Texas Law Review* 84 (2006): 1751–1786. These deﬁnitional troubles suggest that the mass characterization is an ad hoc designation crafted inductively to suit the peculiarities of U.S. incarceration trends at the twentieth century’s close (as Garland observes, “a new name to describe an altogether new phenomenon”).

26 The martial trope of the “war on crime” has similarly hindered the analysis of the transformation and workings of criminal policy. This belligerent designation—espoused by advocates and critics of enlarged incarceration alike—is triply misleading: it passes civilian measures aimed at citizens for a military campaign against foreign foes; it purports to fight “crime” generically when it targets a narrow strand of illegalities (street offenses in the segregated lower-class districts of the city); and it abstracts the criminal justice wing from the broader revamping of the state entailing the simultaneous restriction of welfare and expansion of prisonfare.


29 Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*, chap. 2.


34. Cf. ibid., 17, 27.

35. Lower-class African American women come next as the category with the fastest increase in incarceration over the past two decades, leading to more African American females being under lock than there are total women confined in all of Western Europe. But their capture comes largely as a by-product of the aggressive rolling out of penal policies aimed primarily at their lovers, kin, and neighbors. (Men make up 94 percent of all convicts in the nation.) In any case, the number of female inmates pales before the ranks of the millions of girlfriends and wives of convicts who are subjected to “secondary prisonization” due to the judicial status of their partner; Megan Comfort, *Doing Time Together: Love and Family in the Shadow of the Prison* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).


37. The increase of this index of punitiveness is 299 percent for “violent crimes” as compared with 495 percent for “index crimes” (aggregating violent crime and the major categories of property crime), confirming that the penal state has grown especially more severe toward lesser offenses and thus confines many more marginal delinquents than in the past.


42. Smith, *The New Urban Frontier*.

43. Wacquant, *Deadly Symbiosis*, chap. 3.


48. In the media and policy debates leading up to the 1996 termination of welfare, three racialized figures offered lurid incarnations of “dependency”: the flamboyant and wily “welfare queen,” the immature and irresponsible “teenage mother,” and the aimless and jobless “deadbeat dad.” All three were stereotypically portrayed as African American residents of the dilapidated inner city.


This is well illustrated by the current predicament of California, a state that employs more prison guards than it does social workers; it just slashed its higher education budgets and increased college tuition by 30 percent in response to a deficit of $20 billion in 2009, when it spends an extravagant $10 billion on corrections (more than its yearly outlay for universities for fifteen years running). The state now faces a stark choice between sending its children to college or continuing to throw masses of minor offenders behind bars for brutally long terms.


Contrary to the dominant public vision, research has consistently shown the superiority of rehabilitation over retribution. “Supervision and sanctions, at best, show modest mean reductions in recidivism and, in some instances, have the opposite effect and increase reoffense rates. The mean recidivism effects found in studies of rehabilitation treatment, by comparison, are consistently positive and relatively large”; Mark W. Lipsey and Francis T. Cullen, “The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 3 (2007): 297–320. That hardened criminals do change and turn their lives around is shown by Shadd Maruna, *Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001); that even “lifers” imprisoned for homicide find pathways to redemption is demonstrated by John Irwin, *Lifers: Seeking Redemption in Prison* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

See the powerful arguments of Mary Pattillo for immediately “investing in poor black neighborhoods ‘as is,’” instead of pursuing long-term strategies of dispersal or mixing that are both inefficient and detrimental to the pressing needs and distinct interests of the urban minority poor; Mary Pattillo, “Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods ‘As Is,’” in *Legacy of Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Public Housing*, ed. Margery Turner, Susan Popkin, and Lynette Rawlings (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 2008), 31–46.